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SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW-THE JURY IS WRONG AS A MATTER
OF LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a waitress and bartender at a country club.' After
a long day of work, one of your customers offers you a position at a large
corporation that you cannot refuse. (If you are male, imagine the waitress is
your mother, sister, or wife.) Your customer, Butch, brings you the em-
ployment forms and arranges an interview for you. You are hired. You are
ecstatic about your increased income and career opportunities with the
company. Only two weeks after starting your new job, Butch requests an
offsite meeting with you at a local restaurant. You agree. When you arrive
at the restaurant, you realize that Butch is not interested in talking about
work. He tells you of an affair he had with another married coworker, dis-
cusses his own marital problems, and then propositions you to have a "rela-
tionship" with him. Disgusted and confused, you leave.
The next day at work you tell your supervisor. You confront Butch,
and he promises that it will not happen again. Butch later becomes hostile at
work and overly critical of your performance. Whenever you make the
slightest mistake, such as a typographical error, Butch tells you that you are
incompetent. Additionally, Butch assigns you questionable work projects.
For example, you are given an assignment to be done on his computer.
When you begin the assignment, a picture of a completely naked woman,
his chosen screen saver, appears on the screen. Moreover, Butch unnecessa-
rily touches you every chance he gets and shows you a penis-shaped pacifi-
er on two occasions for no apparent reason. To obtain a promotion as an
automotive parts illustrator, others are asked to sketch automotive parts;
you, on the other hand, have to sketch a picture of his planter, which is
shaped like a man with a penis-shaped cactus protruding from a hole in his
pants.
Later that year, Butch posts a "recruitment poster" on a bulletin board
portraying you as the president and CEO of the "Man Hater's Club of
America." The next year, Butch has you "arrested" at work for a charity
event. He bails you out but will not take you back to work; he instead takes
you to a bar. The next year, Butch requests that you draft the beliefs of the
"He-Man Hater's Club," which includes the following statements: women
are the cause of 99.9 % of stress in men, sperm has a right to live, all great
chiefs of the world are men, and prostitution should be legalized. After en-
1. The following facts are based on Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928
(8th Cir. 2002).
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during three years of this kind of treatment, you decide you can no longer
tolerate it. You resign from the company.
After reporting Butch's behavior to your supervisors and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), you file a claim for sexual
harassment. You go to trial. The jury finds in your favor and grants you
$4600 in backpay and $300,000 in emotional distress damages. On appeal,
the jury's verdict is reversed as a matter of law. The appellate court holds
that the harassment you experienced for three years was not sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter a term, condition, or privilege of your employ-
ment. The holding is based on a reasonable person standard-specifically,
what level of conduct a reasonable person considers severe or pervasive.
Who is this reasonable person? This holding presents the question: Can a
jury composed of twelve people be unreasonable as a matter of law under
these circumstances?
The questions presented by the above factual scenario are the subject
of this note. Many victims of sexual harassment lose their day in court due
to the overzealousness of the federal bench in granting procedural mo-
tions-particularly, overturning jury verdicts as a matter of law. The Eighth
Circuit is no exception. The Eighth Circuit has raised the bar for what is
actionable harassment so high that few plaintiffs ever have their case de-
cided by a jury.2
The opening hypothetical is modeled after the 2002 Eighth Circuit
case, Duncan v. General Motors Corp.3 An appellate panel's reversal of a
jury verdict based on a reasonable person standard is an extreme form of
judicial interference with the intended application of the "totality of the cir-
cumstances" test. The test is intended to consider all of the instances of ha-
rassment collectively rather than judge each instance on its own.4 Over the
years, courts have evaded considering the totality of the circumstances by
using many different devices. Lower courts have dodged the test by mini-
2. See Duncan v. Gen. Motor Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002).
3. Id.
4. See infra Part II.A. Arguably, the most common way that lower courts misapply the
totality of the circumstances test is by misconstruing the severe and pervasive element. This
element is used as an escape route for courts to evade trial by simply claiming that the al-
leged harassment is not severe or pervasive and therefore, not actionable under Title VII. See
Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Coop., 446 F.3d 841, 846 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing Dun-
can v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F. 3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that defendant's conduct
did not create an actionable hostile environment because the court had previously rejected
claims "premised on equally or more egregious facts than those" of the case at hand)); see
Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel., 10 F.3d 526, 534 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing Weiss v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. of Chicago, 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding the defendant's conduct
was "undoubtedly inappropriate" but was not severe or pervasive)). Each of these cases cited
precedent claiming that the alleged conduct was not actionable under Title VII because the
conduct was not severe or pervasive under the established legal standard. See also THERESA
M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V. WORKING REALITIES 21-29 (2005).
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mizing the severity or pervasiveness of a defendant's conduct by separately
analyzing the incidents, plaintiffs, and combination harassment claims (i.e.,
racial and sexual harassment are analyzed separately).' Additionally, courts
have evaded the test by citing only a particular part of Supreme Court dicta,
thus misinterpreting the Court's intent and ultimately undermining the
plaintiff s claim.6 Furthermore, courts have evaded the test by overzealously
5. It is common for courts to minimize the severity of harassment, undermining the
totality of the circumstances test, by completely separating the incidents, severing combina-
tion or multiple harassment claims, and dividing up the targets---considering each target
individual's experience rather than considering the cumulative effect of these incidents on
the environment as a whole. M. Isabel Medina, A Matter of Fact: Hostile Environments and
Summary Judgments, 8 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 311 (1999). See, e.g., Vigil v. City
of Las Cruces, No. 96-2059, 1997 WL 265095, at *1-3 (10th Cir. May 20, 1997) (analyzing
racial and sexual harassment separately and ultimately finding that the conduct was not se-
vere or pervasive); Weiss v. Cola-Cola Bottling Co., 990 F.2d 333, 337 (7th Cir.1993) (find-
ing that the incidents were relatively isolated instead of considering the entire spectrum of
behavior); Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213-14 (7th Cir. 1986), overruled
by Saxton v. Am. Tel. &. Tel., 10 F.3d 526, 533 (7th Cir. 1993) (considering the incidents
separately rather than collectively); Hosey v. McDonald's Corp., C. No. AW-95-196, 1996
WL 414057, at *2-3 (D. Md. May 17, 1996) (analyzing the incidents separately and essen-
tially disregarding them as harmless teenage teasing instead of considering the total effect
that the conduct had on the plaintiff). See also Theresa M. Beiner, Let the Jury Decide: The
Gap Between What Judges and Reasonable People Believe is Sexually Harassing, 75 S. CAL.
L. REV. 791 (2002) ("rather than looking at the effects of all incidents as the 'totality of the
circumstances' standard requires, some courts view the incidents in a piecemeal manner,
essentially concluding that each individual instance is insufficient, while failing to consider
the cumulative effect of all the incidents.").
6. Courts have evaded Supreme Court instructions by both citing and applying a spe-
cific fraction of dicta from a case instead of looking at the broad intent of the Court and by
ignoring its standard completely. Elisabeth A. Keller & Judith B. Tracy, Hidden in Plain
Sight: Achieving More Just Results in Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Cases
by Re-Examining Supreme Court Precedent, 15 DuKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 247, 256-57
(2008). Lower courts will cite only a specific portion of Supreme Court dicta, playing on its
words, in order to support a distorted application of the totality of the circumstances test with
authority. Professors Keller and Tracy find that lower courts have not consistently or ration-
ally applied this [totality of the circumstances] standard. This is not the result of a failure of
the Supreme Court to establish a workable and fair standard, nor is it due to an absence of
scholarly or judicial analysis of those standards. Nevertheless, troubling and confusing
precedent is created and followed because too often Supreme Court cases are relied on for
only the narrowest propositions. Id. at 249 (citing THERESA M. BEINER, GENDER MYTHS V.
WORKING REALITIES 1 (2005)). For example, in Mitchell v. Pope, the court found that the
defendant's conduct was "reprehensible" and "crass and juvenile" but concluded that the
conduct was simply "horseplay." 189 F. App'x 911, 913-14 (11th Cir. 2006). The term
"horseplay" was taken from Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81
(1998). In pulling the term "horseplay" from Oncale and applying it to the facts of Mitchell,
the court failed to recognize that Oncale used the term in the context of analyzing male-on-
male harassment-not male-on-female harassment at issue in Mitchell. Id. The court in Mit-
chell essentially took the term, "horseplay," out of context and applied it to a scenario that
the Supreme Court had not intended.
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granting summary judgment for defendants in sexual harassment cases.7
Lastly, the most offensive judicial avoidance of the totality of the circums-
tances test is reversing jury verdicts as a matter of law. 8 Judgment as a mat-
ter of law is arguably the most offensive procedural device because it in-
vades the province of the jury and undermines the "reasonable person"
standard applicable in these cases.9 The judicial misapplication of the test
creates extremely inconsistent findings of what conduct is considered severe
or pervasive. Disparate judgments issued throughout the circuits reveal this
inconsistency. 10
Due to the fact that there is a plethora of legal commentary critiquing
the courts' use of the previously-mentioned devices, this note will analyze
the problems that result when jury verdicts are overturned as a matter of
law. 1' Overturning jury verdicts enables the judiciary to manipulate the out-
comes of hostile environment sexual harassment claims, thereby undermin-
ing the efficacy of Title VII. Part II provides background necessary to un-
derstand this problem. In Part III, this note proposes modifications and addi-
tions to the law that may remedy or reduce the problems created by the
judicial evasion of the totality of the circumstances test. Finally, this note
concludes in Part IV that the application of the totality of the circumstances
test-used to determine whether harassment is actionable-must be altered
or correctly applied in order to ensure plaintiffs a more just remedy, as op-
7. The complex and conflicting accounts of misconduct in Title VII cases often cannot
be adequately resolved at the pretrial stage of litigation, such as summary judgment. Medina,
supra note 5, at 317. Due to the fact that many discrimination cases "'depend on inferences
rather than on direct evidence, summary judgment should not be granted unless the evidence
could not support any reasonable inference for the nonmovant."' Theresa M. Beiner, The
Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environments Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 71,
95 (1999) (quoting Crawford v. Runyon, 37 F.3d 1338, 1341 (8th Cir. 1994)). At the sum-
mary judgment stage, a judge is not supposed to determine or weigh the credibility of evi-
dence; for that reason, it is inappropriate to grant a summary judgment motion when conflict-
ing testimony exists (which frequently occurs in Title VII cases) because the judge cannot
determine whose story is the correct replication of the facts. Id. at 102.
8. See infra Part II.C. See also infra Part III.A. Reversing a jury's verdict may be the
greatest judicial interference with the intended application of the "totality of the circums-
tances" test because a jury has already found that severe or pervasive harassment occurred.
9. See infra Part II.C.
10. Courts in different jurisdictions continue to look at similar circumstances and reach
opposite results, arguably because of the imprecision of the "totality of the circumstances"
test. Debra D. Burke, Workplace Harassment: A Proposal for a Bright Line Test Consistent
with the First Amendment, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 591, 602-03 (2004); see also 2
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION COORDINATOR, ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW § 48:9 (2008)
(providing a summary of the differing Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Ele-
venth Circuits' decisions as to what particular conduct is severe); MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, 1
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW & LITIGATION § 5:15 (2008) (analyzing what conduct is
found to be sufficiently severe or pervasive among the circuits).
11. See infra Part lI.D.
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posed to the current standard, which permits judges to easily overturn jury
verdicts as a matter of law.
II. BACKGROUND
Before discussing a solution to the problem of overturning judgments
as a matter of law in sexual harassment cases, it is necessary to discuss the
background from which the problem stems. This section first introduces the
fundamentals of sexual harassment law. 12 Second, it traces the legislative
basis for sexual harassment law, examines the role of the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and reviews the Supreme Court
cases that set the standards for the lower courts to follow.1" Third, this sec-
tion will discuss the constitutionality of judgment as a matter of law in Title
VII cases and its application in the Eighth Circuit. 14 Finally, the problems
that sexual harassment creates and exacerbates in the workplace and society
will be canvassed.
1 5
A. Fundamentals of Sexual Harassment Law
Modern sexual harassment law recognizes two different theories of
sexual harassment.1 6 The first type, the quid pro quo claim, is actionable
under Title VII when the discriminatory conduct is linked to a tangible em-
ployment action.' 7 The second type is the hostile environment claim,1
8
which is extensively discussed in this note. A hostile environment occurs
when a harasser's misconduct has "the purpose or effect of unreasonably
interfering with [the target's] work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment."'19 In order for a plaintiff to prevail
on a hostile environment claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) that he or she is a
member of a protected class; (2) that he or she was subjected to unwelcome
12. See infra Part II.A.
13. See infra Part II.B.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). The two types of harass-
ment, named "quid pro quo" and "hostile work environment," were terms coined by Cathe-
rine MacKinnon and did not appear in the statutory text. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth,
524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998). The terms first appeared in Henson v. Dundee and were acknowl-
edged by the Supreme Court in Meritor. Id. (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65; Henson v. Dun-
dee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
17. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65. Before courts recognized the hostile environment claim,
only sexual harassment that sought or required employees "to submit to sexual demands as a
condition to obtain employment or to maintain employment or to obtain promotions" was
actionable under Title VII. Id. at 68.
18. Id. at 65.
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3) (2008).
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sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment complained of was based on sex;
(4) that the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privi-
lege of his or her employment; and (5) that liability can be imputed to the
employer.20
For a hostile environment claim to be actionable under Title VII, the
harassment must be severe or pervasive enough to make the environment
abusive. 21 The fact finder must consider the totality of the circumstances to
determine whether an environment meets this standard.22 Included in this
analysis are the following factors: "the frequency of the discriminatory con-
duct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an
employee's work performance. '23
The use of the totality of the circumstances test was influenced by the
EEOC and became law when the Supreme Court adopted the test.24 The
EEOC guidelines suggested that courts look at the entire record and the
totality of circumstances, including the nature of the sexual advances and
the context in which the advances occurred, on a case by case basis to de-
termine whether sexual misconduct constituted actionable harassment under
Title VII.25 The totality of the circumstances test was extensively discussed
in Harris v. Forklift Systems.2 6 The EEOC guidelines and the Supreme
Court directives permitted lower courts a large amount of flexibility in ap-
plying the test.
27
20. Erenberg v. Methodist Hosp., 357 F.3d 787, 792 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Carter v.
Chrysler Corp., 173 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1999)).
21. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The Court reasoned that
"whether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be determined only by looking at all
the circumstances." Id. at 23.
22. See generally id.
23. Id. (holding that psychological harm is a relevant factor to be taken into account in
determining if sexual harassment occurred, but also holding that no single factor is required).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (b) (2008); see also Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,
69(1986).
25. 29C.F.R. § 1604.11(b).
26. See generally Harris, 510 U.S. at 17.
27. See id. at 24-25 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, referring to the totali-
ty of the circumstances test advocated by the Court, concluded that, "[o]ne of the factors
mentioned in the Court's nonexhaustive list-whether the conduct unreasonably interferes
with an employee's work performance-would, if it were made an absolute test, provide
greater guidance to juries and employers." Id.
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B. Creation of the Totality of the Circumstances Test
1. Legislative Provisions
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII") to "make-
whole" employees who had been aggrieved by employment discrimina-
tion.28 Title VII states, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer.., to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
29
The Chair of the House Rules Committee introduced the proposal to
add "sex" to the prohibited categories only days before the bill was voted on
by the House.30 There is little legislative history discussing the addition of
sex to Title VII because the proposal was intended to defeat the bill. 31 Con-
gress enacted Title VII "to improve the economic and social conditions of
minorities and women by providing equality of opportunity in the work
place." 32 Additionally, Title VII was enacted with the primary objectives to
influence conduct and avoid harm.33
Title VII designated the EEOC as the gatekeeper for discrimination
claims by requiring employees to file a charge with the agency as a precon-
dition to accessing the judicial forum.34 The EEOC developed guidelines
interpreting the statute, but the primary authority for interpretation remained
with the judiciary.35 Although the EEOC guidelines were not binding, courts
used the guidelines to help develop legal rules and discrimination policies
for Title VII cases.36 The EEOC also implemented procedural regulations
28. Medina, supra note 5, at 318; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (2008).
29. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (a)(1) (West 2008).
30. Medina, supra note 5, at 319.
31. Id. (citing 110 Cong. Rec. 2577-84 (daily ed. Feb. 8, 1964)). Professor Medina
makes the valid conclusion in her article that even though the legislators' motives initially
may not have been to prohibit sexual harassment, the language of Title VII expressly prohi-
bits the employment practice of sexual harassment. Id.
32. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (b) (2008).
33. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (citing Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (holding that Title VI's objective "like that of any
statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but to avoid harm")).
34. Medina, supra note 5, at 321.
35. See id. To clarify, the EEOC's duty was to investigate harassment claims and to
attempt to conciliate the claim outside of the court system. Id.
36. See id. at 322. The EEOC guidelines served as an "'administrative interpretation of
the Act [Title VII] by the enforcing agency,"' and the guidelines, "'while not controlling
upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed
2010]
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such as requiring employers to maintain personnel records that revealed the
gender, ethnic, and racial diversity of their employees.37 Additionally, the
EEOC was an educational resource for aggrieved employees seeking re-
course through litigation.38
Eight years later, Congress passed the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972 citing evidence that women and minorities continued to expe-
rience a high unemployment rate, a low occupational status, and, conse-
quently, low income levels.39 Yet again in 1991, Congress responded to the
Supreme Court's and the EEOC's failure to enforce antidiscrimination poli-
cies and address the problem of widespread workplace sex discrimination
by increasing the private remedies available to those who had experienced
intentional or malicious discrimination. 40 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 es-
tablished that a Title VII claimant was entitled to a jury trial if he or she was
seeking compensatory or punitive damages. 4 1 The Act had two primary pur-
poses: (1) "to respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by restoring the
civil rights protections that were dramatically limited by those decisions";
and (2) "to strengthen existing protections and remedies available under
federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence and adequate
compensation for victims of discrimination. ' '42 The Act was considered con-
troversial, and legislators expressed fears that the Act would create "a law-
yer's mecca" and "an employer's nightmare., 43 In order to prevent the
enactment of the "lawyers-get-rich-quick bill,"44 the Act provided that dam-
ages would be capped-with a maximum ranging from $50,000 to
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance."' Meritor Say.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433-34 (1971) and Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976)).
37. Medina, supra note 5, at 322.
38. See 29 C.F.R. §1604.11(f) (2008). The EEOC enforced regulations advising em-
ployers to take every precautionary measure to prevent sexual harassment from occurring,
such as educating employees about their rights to file a harassment claim and the procedure
for doing so. Id.
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.19 (b) (2008).
40. Medina, supra note 5, at 324. See also H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2 (1991), as re-
printed in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694.
41. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2. The Act provided that limited punitive damages were
available "'if the complaining party demonstrate[d] that the respondent engaged in a discri-
minatory practice . . . with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected
rights of an aggrieved individual."' Medina, supra note 5, at 326-27 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §
198 l a(b)(1)). Compensatory damages were to be granted to the prevailing plaintiff for "dam-
ages for 'future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses ... ' Id. at 327 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981a(b)(3)).
42. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2.
43. Medina, supra note 5, at 312 (citing 136 CONG. REc. H6753 (daily ed. Oct. 22,
1990); 137 CONG. REC. S15365-66 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (remarks of Senator Mikulski)).
44. Id. at 326 n. 51 (citing 136 CONG. REC. H6753 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1990)).
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$300,000--depending on the number of employees working for an employ-
er.
45
2. The Development of Sexual Harassment Law by the Supreme
Court
The Supreme Court first recognized sexual harassment as actionable
under Title VII in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.46 In that case, the Court
set out two types of harassment: (1) harassment conditioning employment
benefits on sexual favors, and (2) harassment creating a hostile or offensive
working environment without affecting economic benefits. 47 Further, the
Court declared that the language of Title VII did not limit a claim of sexual
harassment to those claims that involved financial or other tangible forms of
discrimination.48 The Court consulted the EEOC guidelines to develop the
hostile environment claim.49 Additionally, the Court implemented a severe
or pervasive standard which states that in order for sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive as to alter the condi-
tions of employment and create an abusive working environment.5 °
Subsequently, the Supreme Court clarified the standard for analyzing
sexual harassment cases in 1993.51 In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., the
Supreme Court further explained the totality of the circumstances test.52 The
45. Id. at 327 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3).
46. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
47. Id. at 65. The Court looked to the EEOC Guidelines. Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a) (1985)). In addition, Meritor established that the correct inquiry to determine
whether sexual harassment has taken place should be whether the conduct is "unwelcome"
rather than whether the victim entered into a "voluntary" relationship with an employer. Id.
at 68. Meritor briefly touched on employer liability holding that employers are not automati-
cally liable for sexual harassment in the workplace, but that liability should be determined by
common law agency principles. Id. at 72.
48. Id. at 64. The Court explained that the "phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women' in employment." Id. (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water &
Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978) (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th Cir. 1971)). To further clarify, a significant change in employment
status is one which involves a tangible employment action such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassigning with significantly different responsibilities, or causing a significant
change in benefits. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (citing Crady
v. Liberty Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 993 F.2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) (describing adverse
changes in employment as: termination, a demotion, a less distinguished title, a material loss
of benefits, diminished responsibilities, or other indications of adversity based on the particu-
lar set of facts at hand)).
49. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 l(a)(3)).
50. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).




totality of the circumstances test was used to determine whether the harass-
ment was egregious enough to violate Title VII.53 The Court took a "middle
path," finding that actionable harassment existed somewhere between con-
duct that was merely offensive and conduct that caused "tangible psycho-
logical injury. 54 The Court held that the determination of whether conduct
was actionable included both an objective and subjective component.55 As
the court explained:
[c]onduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment-an environment that a reasonable
person would find hostile or abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview.
Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to
be abusive, the conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the vic-
tim's employment, and there is no Title VII violation.
But Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct leads to a
nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even
one that does not seriously affect employees' psychological well-being, can
and often will detract from employees' job performance, discourage em-
ployees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their
careers. Moreover,... the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so
severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees
because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VIIs
broad rule of workplace equality.56
The Court explained that the totality of the circumstances test "is not,
and by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise test. 57 Further, the
Court gave a nonexclusive list of factors to be considered which included
the following: "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating; or a mere offensive ut-
terance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance.,
5 8
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia foreshadowed the future complica-
tions that lower courts would experience in implementing the test. 59 He con-




56. Id. at 21-22 (emphasis added).
57. Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
58. Id. at 23. The court explained that any relevant factor may be considered, including
an employee's psychological well-being, but that no factor was determinative or required in
order for an abusive environment to be considered severe or pervasive. Id.
59. Id. at 24-25 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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[a]s a practical matter, today's holding lets virtually unguided juries de-
cide whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an em-
ployer is egregious enough to warrant an award of damages .... Be that
as it may, I know of no alternative to the course the Court today has tak-
en. One of the factors mentioned in the Court's nonexhaustive list-
whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with an employee's work
performance-would, if it were made an absolute test, provide greater
guidance to juries and employers. But I see no basis for such a limitation
in the language of the statute.... I know of no test more faithful to the
inherently vague statutory language than the one the Court today
adopts.
60
Five years after Harris, the Supreme Court of the United States again
discussed the totality of the circumstances test in Oncale v. Sundowner Off-
shore Services, Inc., which held that a Title VII violation does not have to
be motivated by sexual desire to support a claim of sex discrimination.
61
Essentially, the Court broadened the test by emphasizing that the severity of
the harassment should be evaluated considering all the circumstances,
which "requires careful consideration of the social context in which particu-
lar behavior occurs and is experienced by its target., 62 The Court stated that
60. Id. Justice Scalia's insightful reasoning further considered the standard (the totality
of the circumstances test):
"Abusive" (or "hostile," which in this context I take to mean the same thing)
does not seem to me a very clear standard-and I do not think clarity is at all in-
creased by adding the adverb "objectively" or by appealing to a "reasonable per-
son['s]" notion of what the vague word means. Today's opinion does list a num-
ber of factors that contribute to abusiveness, . . .but since it neither says how
much of each is necessary (an impossible task) nor identifies any single factor
as determinative, it thereby adds little certitude .... One might say that what
constitutes "negligence" (a traditional jury question) is not much more clear and
certain than what constitutes "abusiveness." Perhaps so. But the class of plain-
tiffs seeking to recover for negligence is limited to those who have suffered
harm, whereas under this statute "abusiveness" is to be the test of whether legal
harm has been suffered, opening more expansive vistas of litigation.
Id. at 24. Justice Scalia predicted that the totality of the circumstances test and the methods
employed to determine if conduct was severe or pervasive would increase employment dis-
crimination litigation (hence, "expansive vistas"). See id Future cases reveal just the oppo-
site. The totality of the circumstances test is used to decrease litigation by manipulating the
test to find misconduct not actionable under the severe or pervasive standard. See supra notes
5-8. To explain, the application of the totality of the circumstances test reduces litigation by
allowing courts to resolve Title VII claims on summary judgment motions. See supra note 7.
61. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998). The Court
addressed fears that liability for same-sex harassment would turn Title VII into a "general
civility code for the American Workplace," but it pointed out that Title VII had other safe-
guards to prevent such a "code" from developing; specifically the Court declared that a
same-sex plaintiff would still have to prove her claim under the severe or pervasive standard
determined by the totality of the circumstances test. Id. at 80-81.
62. Id. at 81. The Court used a helpful analogy to describe how important the context of
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[t]he real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a con-
stellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships
which are not fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or
the physical acts performed. Common sense, and an appropriate sensi-
tivity to social context, will enable courts and juries to distinguish be-
tween simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex,
and conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would
find severely hostile or abusive.
63
Oncale significantly broadened the scope of harassment and reinforced
the importance of considering the entire context in which the alleged mis-
conduct occurred.
The cases addressed in this section indicate that the Supreme Court in-
tended a wide range of factors to be considered under the totality of the cir-
cumstances test. Meritor, Harris, and Oncale each broadened the types of
behavior that can be actionable harassment and provided guidance to the
lower courts in implementing the totality of the circumstances test. The fol-
lowing section will discuss the lower courts' interpretation of the totality of
the circumstances test. The section will analyze the lower courts' use of
judgment as a matter of law in Title VII cases and its potential interference
with the totality of the circumstances test.
C. Judgment as a Matter of Law
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment as a matter of
law is granted "[i]f a party has been fully heard on an issue during a jury
trial and the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally suf-
ficient evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue. .. ."64 It is ques-
tionable, however, whether the use of judgment as a matter of law is appro-
priate in Title VII cases because the totality of the circumstances test makes
the standard "that of the reasonable person.' 65
Furthermore, "judgment as a matter of law is proper 'when all the evi-
dence points in one direction and is susceptible to no reasonable interpreta-
tion supporting the jury verdict.' 66 Many sexual harassment claims consist
harassment is in determining if the alleged behavior constituted harassment. Id. "A profes-
sional football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively abusive, for
example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he heads onto the field-even if the
same behavior would reasonably be experienced as abusive by the coach's secretary (male or
female) back at the office." Id.
63. Id. at 81-82.
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(l)(A).
65. See supra Part II.B.
66. Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Blackmon
v. Pinkerton Sec. & Investigative Servs., 182 F.3d 629, 635 (8th Cir. 1999)).
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of varying recollections of events by both the plaintiff and harasser;67 there-
fore, it is difficult to understand how the version of events a jury chooses to
believe could often be wrong as a matter of law under a reasonable person
standard. A judge using this procedural device after a jury has already found
for the plaintiff is problematic because a jury has already decided, under the
facts presented, that the defendant's conduct created a hostile environment.
Essentially, a judge or appellate panel that overturns a jury verdict under a
reasonable person standard is stating that the members of the jury were not
reasonable people.
This section presents three constitutional considerations that arise
when a jury's verdict is overturned as a matter of law in a Title VII case.
The plaintiffs right to have his or her day in court, 68 the right to a jury tri-
al,69 and the right to have an impartial fact finder7" will be considered. Af-
terward, legal precedent in the Eighth Circuit will be discussed.71
1. Constitutional Considerations & Title VII
Although the Supreme Court has decided that granting motions for
judgment as a matter of law or overturning jury verdicts as a matter of law
is constitutional, some argue that it is not.72 Arthur Miller, a Harvard Law
professor, claimed that "[o]verly enthusiastic use of summary judgment
means that trial worthy cases will be terminated ... on motion papers, pos-
sibly compromising the litigants' constitutional rights to a day in court and
jury trial., 73 He argued that when verdict motions are viewed "without the
safeguards and environment of a trial setting, courts may be tempted to treat
67. Cf Beiner, supra note 6, at 102-03. The differing perceptions of the facts existing
between the plaintiff and the harasser make the determination of the facts "troublesome" for
courts, yet they are comfortable using the procedural device of summary judgment as well.
Id.
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
69. Id. In civil cases, the right to an impartial jury is inherent in the Seventh Amend-
ment. McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing Kieman v. Van Schaik,
347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1965)).
70. McCoy, 652 F.2d at 657 ("the Constitution guarantees... a fair and impartial jury").
71. See generally infra Part II.C.2.b.
72. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the "Litigation Explo-
sion, " "Liability Crisis," and Efficiency Clichis Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial
Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L. REv. 982, 1067 (2003). Miller argued that if a court finds a
case "a close call" then summary judgment is inappropriate. Because Miller uses the terms
summary judgment, directed verdict, and judgment as a matter of law interchangeably
throughout his article, it is not a stretch to apply his reasoning to judgment as a matter of law.
See also Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REv. 139,
166-67 (2007).
73. Miller, supra note 72, at 1071.
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the evidence in a piecemeal rather than cumulative fashion .... "7 Although
Professor Miller was specifically referencing summary judgment motions,
he loosely applied the same arguments to directed verdict motions and
judgment as a matter of law motions. 75 This application makes sense be-
cause each of these motions determines "whether a reasonable jury could
find for the nonmoving party." 76 Thus, they employ the same standard. The
totality of the circumstances, conceivably, is not considered when judges
review the trial record in a piecemeal manner on appeal; therefore, there is a
potential risk that the test will be incorrectly applied, arguably infringing on
the plaintiff's right to a jury trial.
In the past, courts have contemplated this probable constitutional in-
fringement. The Seventh Amendment guarantees that "'the right of trial by
jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court in the United States, than according to the rules of
common law.' ' 77 In Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, the Su-
preme Court decided that a verdict may be constitutionally dismissed on the
merits under common law principles, and thus this procedure did not violate
the Seventh Amendment. 78 On the contrary, Professor Suja Thomas has
argued that this case was wrongly decided by erroneously describing the
common law procedures.79 Professor Thomas argued that under common
law, if a court determined that the verdict was not supported by the evi-
dence, the court could not enter judgment for the party who lost, but rather
would grant a new trial. 80 Thomas indicated that the fact that Redman al-
lowed a judge to decide "both the sufficiency of the evidence and the out-
come of the case" was a violation of common law principles.81 As a result,
Redman drastically changed the role of the jury by effectively restricting the
right to a jury trial.82
Nevertheless, judgment as a matter of law has corrected the misappli-
cation of law in certain cases and has been a valuable procedural device that
has promoted efficiency in the courts.83 Issues arise, however, when a court
applies Rule 50 with a "result-oriented [and] efficiency-motivated" goal
74. Id.
75. See generally id. at 1072.
76. See Thomas, supra note 72, at 166-67.
77. See Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 656-57 (1935) (quoting
U.S. CONST. amend. VII). In Redman, the Court held that reversing a verdict as a matter of
law on appeal is constitutional and that a new trial is not required.
78. Id. at 661.
79. Thomas, supra note 72, at 168.
80. Id. at 168-69.
81. Id. at 168.
82. Id. Professor Thomas explains that "Redman was a drastic change to the jurispru-
dence of the Court on the role of the jury." Id.
83. Cf. Miller, supra note 72, at 1075.
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because it increases the risk that the judge will decide the case arbitrarily,
thus curtailing litigants' access to trials-and obviously, a jury.
84
Historically under the common law, the constitutionally permissible
procedure was to grant a new trial-not to impose a directed verdict (i.e.
judgment as a matter of law). 5 In Slocum v. New York Life Insurance Co.,
the Supreme Court analyzed the possible constitutional encroachments.86 In
Slocum, the Court found that because a court could reevaluate the facts and
grant judgment to the losing party under judgment notwithstanding the ver-
dict, the procedure was unconstitutional. 87 If the facts of a case are undis-
puted or accepted as true from the pleadings, a court may constitutionally
determine the judgment as a matter of law; however, a court may not consti-
tutionally examine the sufficiency of the evidence to determine the ver-
dict.88 In Title VII cases, when verdicts are overturned as a matter of law on
the severe or pervasive standard, the appellate panel may be perceived to be
weighing the sufficiency of the evidence. This weighing of the evidence is
not constitutionally permissible under the Seventh Amendment.89
Additionally, under the Seventh Amendment, judges decide legal is-
sues and juries decide factual issues.90 Congress intended the court's role to
be supervisory and directive, and the jury's role was to make the ultimate
determination of factual issues.91 In Slocum, the Court, referencing these
varying roles, explained, "[o]nly through the co-operation of the two, each
acting within its appropriate sphere, can the constitutional right be satisfied.
And so, to dispense with either, or to permit one to disregard the province of
the other, is to impinge on that right., 92 The reasonable person standard
employed by the totality of circumstances test in Title VII cases, presents a
question of fact-whether harassment is severe or pervasive enough that a
reasonable person would find that it altered the terms or conditions of his or
her employment. 93 This question calls for a determination of the facts. It is
the jury's role to resolve it.
94
84. Id. at 1076.
85. Thomas, supra note 72, at 168-69.
86. See Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364 (1913) (holding that it was imper-
missible for a court to reexamine the facts of a dispute other than according to the rules of
common law).
87. Thomas, supra note 72, at 175 (citing Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364,
399 (1913)).
88. Id. at 166, 175.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 166, 168.
91. Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 382 (1913).
92. Id.
93. See supra Part 1l.B.
94. See Slocum, 228 U.S. at 382.
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Another constitutional consideration that arises in Title VII cases when
a judge overturns a jury verdict as a matter of law is the due process right to
an impartial decision maker.95 Initially it may be difficult to identify how
this due process issue arises in a Title VII case. Certain sources have re-
vealed, however, that some judges may be biased against Title VII claims.
96
For example, the Eighth Circuit's Gender Fairness Task Force Report re-
vealed that twenty-nine percent of plaintiffs' attorneys and eleven percent of
defendants' attorneys reported that judges indicated that sex discrimination
cases as "frivolous, unimportant, or undeserving of federal court time."
97
The report also found that one-third of plaintiffs' attorneys and one-quarter
of defendants' attorneys reported that "sex discrimination cases had been
pushed through the courts without adequate time for discovery [and] with
some frequency. 98 Moreover, over fifty percent of plaintiffs' attorneys
found that the discovery in such cases was inappropriately intrusive com-
pared to 17.3 percent of defendants' attorneys. 99 The majority of judges
expressed no opinion on whether discovery in Title VII cases was inappro-
priately intrusive.'l 0 It is fair to question the impartiality of judges if some
judges regard Title VII cases based on sex as frivolous and other judges are
neutral on the statement.'
0'
Additionally, the report exposed that unwanted sexual attention is an
issue in the courtroom. 10 2 Usually in the form of "gender-based incivility,"
unwanted behaviors include sexually suggestive comments, unprofessional
types of address, distasteful remarks about appearance, offensive jokes, and
being mistaken for a "non-lawyer."' 1 3 A small percentage of judges reported
that they experienced unwanted sexual attention, and women reported sig-
nificantly more experiences than men. Some even reported that the offender
was a judge. 1 4 A noteworthy finding of the report was that most courtroom
employees were unaware of their sexual harassment policy, and even some
95. See U.S. CONST. amend. V & VI. See also McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 657
(6th Cir. 1981) (citing Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1965)).
96. See Gender Fairness Task Force, Final Report and Recommendations of the Eighth
Circuit Gender Fairness Task Force, 31 CREIGHTON L. REv. 9, 15 (1997) [hereinafter Fair-
ness Task Force]. See also Catchpole v. Brannon, 36 Cal. App. 4th 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).




101. Id. at 73. The report states "the great majority of judges," but does not list the actual
percentage of judges who were neutral to the statement. Id.
102. Fairness Task Force, supra note 96, at 18-20.
103. Id. at 18.
104. Id. at 19.
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courts in the Eighth Circuit reported that they had no written Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity complaint Policy.105
In one case, Catchpole v. Brannon, the judicial hostility of the trial
judge in a sexual harassment case was clear to the appellate court.1°6 In Cat-
chpole, the judge basically cross-examined the target of the harassment in a
condescending manner, asking questions such as, "[D]id you blame yourself
for letting this happen?" and "Did you ever consider just leaving without
your clothes?"'17 On appeal, the plaintiff claimed that the judge "displayed a
belief that sexual harassment cases are relatively unimportant and invoked
sexual stereotypes in evaluating [the victim's] behavior and credibility."'0 8
The verdict was reversed, and the court granted the plaintiff a new trial after
the appellate court found that the trial judge "conveyed the sense he consi-
dered sexual harassment cases 'detrimental to everyone concerned' and a
misuse of the judicial system."'10 9 Ultimately, the court found that the plain-
tiff was not given a fair trial and that it was doubtful that the trial judge was
impartial. 10 In summary, the evidence of judicial bias towards Title VII
plaintiffs raises the question of whether Title VII cases are adjudicated by
neutral judges.
2. Application of Judgment as a Matter of Law in Title VII Cases
a. Importance of a jury trial under the reasonable person
standard
Congress granted Title VII plaintiffs the right to a jury trial in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991."'1 Furthermore, jury trials provide plaintiffs with the
benefit of "secret deliberations and the rendering of relatively impartial de-
cisions by a group of citizens representing society rather than deferring to
the opinions, reasoning, and conclusions of a single judge."" 2 Justice
Blackstone recognized the importance of jury trials
explain[ing]: [A] competent number of sensible and upright jurymen...
will be found the best investigators of truth and the surest guardians of
public justice .... Every new tribunal, erected for the decisions of facts,
105. Id. at 20.
106. 36 Cal. App. 4th 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
107. Id. at 257.
108. Id. at 249.
109. Id. at 249. The Court also found that the judge's "predetermined disposition" made
him likely to rule against her solely based on her status as a woman. Id. at 248.
110. Id. at 262.
111. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 29. Any party may demand a jury trial in cases where
compensatory or punitive damages are sought under Title VII. Id.
112. Miller, supra note 72, at 1077.
2010]
UALR LAW REVIEW
without the intervention of a jury... is a step towards establishing aris-
tocracy, the most oppressive of absolute governments.113
The Supreme Court continues to support jury trials by repeatedly ex-
pressing the value of reconciling factual discrepancies by "citizens who
represent the community at large. ' ' 14 Additionally, the reasonable person
standard is best assessed when courts and judges allow the jury to perform
its primary function: "to make commonsense determinations about human
behavior, reasonableness, and state of mind based on objective stan-
dards.""' Judgment as a matter of law takes this determination away from
the jury.
More importantly and specifically pertinent to a Title VII jury trial, so-
cial science studies show that people generally agree on what type of mis-
conduct constitutes sexual harassment. 116 Jurors tend to be reasonable
people. Therefore, when a judge overturns a jury verdict as a matter of law,
he or she is essentially claiming to be more reasonable than the jury. More-
over, research shows that people consider a broader range of conduct to be
sexual harassment than courts recognize as legally actionable under Title
VII.' In addition, people are logical in their approach to evaluating sexual
harassment. For example, typically the more severe the incident, the more
likely people will perceive it as sexual harassment. 18 In addition, studies
show that the conduct is not generally considered harassment until it reaches
a certain level of frequency." 9 Studies also indicate that the more frequent
the harassment is, the more people will consider the behavior to be harass-
ing. 20 Furthermore, studies revealed that when frequency increased, more
people found the harasser responsible and deserving of disciplinary treat-
113. Id. at 1077-78 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *380).
114. Id. at 1078.
115. Id. at 1134.
116. UNITED STATES MERIT SYSTEM, PROTECTION BOARD, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL WORKPLACE: TRENDS, PROGRESS, CONTINUING CHALLENGES viii (1995) at 7, tbl. 1.
[hereinafter USMSPB]. ("The report discusses the results of a study undertaken by the board
to determine the nature and extent of sexual harassment in the Federal Government. The
results of the current study indicate that unwanted sexual attention remains a widespread
problem in the Federal sector").
117. Id. at 45, tbl.1. See infra Part II.C.2.b (providing examples of the range of behaviors
that courts in the Eighth Circuit are finding actionable).
118. Christopher W. Williams, Richard S. Brown & Paul R. Lees-Haley, An Attributional
(Causal Dimensional) Analysis of Perceptions of Sexual Harassment, 25 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1169, 1174 (1995).
119. Jennifer L. Hurt, Jillian A. Mayer & David Hoffman, Situational and Individual
Influences on Judgments of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 29 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1395, 1397 (1999).
120. Daniel A. Thomann & Richard L. Wiener, Physical and Psychological Causality as
Determinants of Culpability in Sexual Harassment Cases, 17 SEX ROLES 573, 585 (1987).
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ment. 12' These studies support the notion that jurors are capable of making
appropriate decisions in sexual harassment cases. The factors that the pre-
vious studies use as variables-the severity and frequency of the harass-
ment-are consistent with the legal standards jurors are asked to apply. In
summary, it should be a rare occurrence when a court reverses a jury verdict
under the reasonable person standard in sexual harassment cases.
Comparably, a study of federal employees revealed that over fifty per-
cent of men and women found the following behavior to be sexually harass-
ing: pressure for sexual favors; deliberate touching or cornering; suggestive
letters, calls, or materials; pressure for dates; suggestive looks or gestures;
and sexual teasing, jokes, or remarks. 122 The federal study shows that a ma-
jority of people find a broader scope of behavior to be sexual harassment
than the appellate courts. 123 If the majority of people believe these types of
behaviors constitute sexual harassment, courts should consider this data
when deciding to overturn a jury's verdict.
b. Judgment as a matter of law in the Eighth Circuit
In the Eighth Circuit, Duncan v. General Motors Corp. provides an ex-
ample of a case in which the court overturned the jury verdict for the plain-
tiff as a matter of law on appeal. 124 In Duncan, Diana Duncan was a bar-
tender at a country club until one of her customers, James Booth, arranged
for her to interview for a position at General Motors Corporation (GMC).
25
Only two weeks after working at the corporation, he asked her to meet him
for an off-site meeting. 126 During the meeting he informed her of his marital
problems and his affair with another woman at work, and then proposi-
tioned her to have a sexual relationship with him. 27 She refused his offer
and confronted him about his inappropriate behavior at work.128 After the
rejection, Booth became hostile and more critical of her work.1
29
Furthermore, over the course of her employment, Booth requested that
Duncan complete many questionable tasks.' 30 He required her to complete
an assignment on his computer that displayed a completely naked woman as
121. Id.
122. USMSPB, supra note 116, at 7, tbl. 1.
123. Cf BEINER, supra note 4, at 29-30.






130. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 931-32. Duncan worked at General Motors Corporation from
August 1994 to May 1997. Id.
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the screen saver.13 1 He unnecessarily touched her whenever she would hand
him the telephone.' 32 Also on two occasions, he showed her a pacifier that
was shaped like a penis.
33
Shortly thereafter, when she applied for a promotion, Booth required
that she draw a penis shaped planter; however, other applicants were re-
quired to draw automotive parts. 13 4 Subsequently, Booth posted a recruit-
ment poster that portrayed Duncan as the president and CEO of the Man
Hater's Club of America. 135 Furthermore, Booth had Duncan "arrested" at
work as part of a charity event, but when he bailed her out he would not
return her to work despite her protests; instead, he took her to a bar.136 Last-
ly, Booth asked Duncan to type a draft of the beliefs of the He-Men Women
Hater's Club, which included such items as "sperm has a right to live" and
"prostitution should be legalized."'' 37 Duncan resigned two days after Booth
requested she draft the previous beliefs.'
38
After hearing these facts, twelve jurors found that Booth's misconduct
was severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile environment for Diana
Duncan. 39 A district judge allowed the jury's verdict to stand even after the
defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law.' 40 Thus, the jury and
judge who witnessed the facts developed at trial believed a verdict for Dun-
can was warranted. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned, "Booth's
actions were boorish, chauvinistic, and decidedly immature, but we cannot
say they created an objectively hostile work environment permeated with
sexual harassment."' 41 Furthermore, the court concluded that "the evidence




134. Id. at 931-32. Duncan was applying for an illustrator's position at the company. Id.
at 931. In order to prove her artistic ability, Booth required that she draw a planter on his
desk. Id. at 932. The planter was a man wearing a sombrero with a cactus protruding like a
penis out of a hole in the front of his pants. Id. at 931. She was treated completely differently
than the other employees. Ultimately, Duncan did not get the promotion because she lacked a
college degree. Id. at 932.
135. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 932. The poster listed the membership qualifications as: "Must
always be in control of: (1) Checking, Savings, all loose change, etc.; (2) (Ugh) Sex; (3)
Raising children our way!; (4) Men must always do household chores; (5) Consider T.V.
Dinners a gourmet meal." Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 932.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 933. The Court of Appeals disagreed, stating, "We conclude as a matter of law
that [Duncan] did not show a sexually harassing hostile environment sufficiently severe or
pervasive so as to alter the conditions of her employment, a failure that dooms Duncan's
hostile work environment claim." Id. at 935.
140. Id. at 933.
141. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 935. Further, the court held, "It is apparent that these incidents
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[was] sufficient to support the jury finding that the harassment was based on
sex," yet the court overturned the jury's verdict for Diana Duncan.
42
Subsequently, forty-four courts have followed Duncan, and one hun-
dred and forty-four courts have cited it to date. 43 The vast number of courts
that rely on Duncan suggests that Duncan is a pivotal case. Furthermore,
Duncan heightened the level of misconduct needed for harassment to be
actionable in the Eighth Circuit. 44 As a result, subsequent courts have cited
Duncan as precedent essentially permitting defendants to escape liability
under the severe or pervasive standard. 145
To illustrate, Cottrill v. MFA, Inc. is an Eighth Circuit case that cited
Duncan as precedent for the severe or pervasive standard. 146 In Cottrill, a
manager installed a peephole and a two way mirror in the single restroom
provided for women at a company that employed 1900 workers.147 The
manager watched the plaintiff two to three times daily over a five year pe-
riod. 48 The plaintiff also testified on numerous occasions that there was a
clear sticky substance--cornstarch--on the toilet seat and toilet paper hold-
er.149 As a result of exposure to the substance, the plaintiff sought medical
treatment for sporadic rashes. 50 The trial court granted summary judgment
to MFA and the appellate court affirmed citing Duncan.'5' The court held
that the trial court did not err in finding that Cottrill failed to establish a
made Duncan uncomfortable, but they do not meet the standard necessary for actionable
sexual harassment." Id.
142. Id. at 934.
143. Lexis Nexis Shepard's Report of Duncan v. Gen. Motor Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th
Cir. 2002) current through Feb. 4, 2009. This citation refers to the electronic Lexis Nexis
feature called "Shepardize" which lists every source in which a case has been cited. [herei-
nafter Shepard's Report]. Duncan has been cited a total of 280 times for the following: (1)
distinguished by courts 11 times; (2) followed by courts 44 times; (3) cited by courts 144
times; (4) cited in the Eighth Circuit 135 times; (5) cited once in annotated statute; (6) cited
in 13 Law Reviews or periodicals; (7) cited in 11 treatises; (8) cited in 51 briefs; and (9) cited
in 59 motions. Id. It is important to note that the courts that merely cite Duncan compare the
facts of Duncan to the facts at issue.
144. The fact that over one hundred courts have cited Duncan proves that Duncan is
being used as a reference for the applicable standard.
145. To further clarify, these courts are using Duncan as an example of what type of
conduct is not severe or pervasive. This comparison ultimately allows these courts to find for
the defendant by claiming that the defendant's behavior was not as severe or pervasive as the
facts of Duncan.
146. 443 F.3d 629, 638 (8th Cir. 2006).
147. Id. at 631.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 633.
150. Id. at 631.
151. Id. at 638.
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question of material fact as to whether the alleged harassment was severe or
pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. 1
52
Shortly thereafter in 2006, Powell v. Yellowbook USA, Inc. cited Dun-
can as a reference for the severe or pervasive standard. 153 In Powell, a co-
worker solicited the plaintiff for sex, tried to convert the plaintiff to her reli-
gion, and spiked her beverage-a diet Pepsi-with methamphetamine.'
54
The plaintiff filed three claims under Title VII for sexual harassment, reli-
gious harassment, and retaliation. 55 The district court granted summary
judgment to Yellowbook on all claims. 56 The appellate court upheld this
decision citing Duncan, holding that the sexual harassment experienced by
Powell was not severe or pervasive. 157 The appellate court specifically com-
pared the propositioning for a sexual relationship in Duncan to that in Pow-
ell and as a result found the conduct was not actionable under Title VII.1
58
Powell is a prime example of how Duncan has affected the severe or perva-
sive standard in the Eighth Circuit.
In addition, at least one court has cited Duncan in a case involving a
male plaintiff and a male harasser. 59 In Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley
Electric Cooperative, the male plaintiff, nicknamed stub, 160 experienced
verbal harassment, offensive sexual banter, obscene gestures, and sexual
jokes.' 6 1 Moreover, on one occasion he was physically assaulted when an
employee rubbed a shovel between his legs. 162 Although this type of mis-
conduct occurred throughout the plaintiff's twenty years of employment, the
court, citing Duncan, found that the conduct was not severe or pervasive.
163
The court reasoned that Nitsche's claim was not actionable because other
152. Cottrill, 443 F.3d at 638. Although the defendant pleaded guilty to a Class "C"
felony for invasion of privacy, the employer was not held liable for a Title VII violation
because the court held the conduct was not severe or pervasive. Id. at 633, 638. The court
held that the plaintiff had "not established that the alleged harassment was objectively 'so
intimidating, offensive, or hostile that it poisoned the work environment."' Id at 639 (inter-
nal citations omitted). This statement arguably does not comport with the Supreme Court's
objectives for the totality of the circumstances test. See supra Part Il.B. Moreover, the court
in Cottrill cited Duncan and imposed an even higher bar for misconduct to be actionable by
suggesting that the work environment need to be "poisoned." Cottrill, 443 F.2d at 639.
153. 445 F.3d 1074, 1077 (8th Cir. 2006).
154. Id. at 1076.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1077.
158. Id.
159. See Nitsche v. CEO of Osage Valley Elec. Coop., 446 F.3d 841 (8th Cir. 2006).
160. Id. at 843. The co-worker called him stub because his fingers were short which
allegedly indicated that he had a short penis. Id.
161. Id. at 843-44. Additionally, Nitsche found mice and snakes in his lunch box, was
the subject of a demeaning poem, and was frequently called other crude names. Id.
162. Id. at 843.
163. Id. at 846.
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courts-referring to Duncan-had rejected "claims premised on equally or
more egregious facts."' 64
In Tatum v. Arkansas Department of Health, like Duncan, the jury
found for the plaintiff; however, in Tatum, the district court judge granted
judgment as a matter of law to the defendant, and this was affirmed on ap-
peal. 165 Jane Tatum worked in an atmosphere that tolerated sexual jokes,
cartoons, and gags.166 She was not personally offended until another em-
ployee, Robert McCuan, accosted her in the break room.167 McCuan ap-
proached Tatum from behind and said, "I want you.' ' 168 He then grabbed her
hand, placed it on his penis, and said, "See how hard it is? Doesn't that feel
good?" Tatum immediately jerked her hand away, and returned to her office
in a state of shock. 169 She told no one about the incident.170 Later, McCuan
asked Tatum to come over to his home for the weekend because his family
and granddaughter would be out of town.'71 After this, Tatum reported both
incidents to her administrator. 172 After she reported the incident, Tatum con-
fronted McCuan in his office with her supervisor, and McCuan screamed
"Get out of my office now."'173 Tatum's supervisor later told her she would
"have hell to pay" if she pursued her complaint any further. 174 The company
began an investigation and another employee reported that McCuan had
harassed her as well. 75 Tatum eventually resigned, and McCuan was never
punished for his misconduct. 176 Comparatively, the harassment is conceiva-
bly more severe than that alleged in Duncan.'
77
The jury found for Tatum, awarding her $300,000-the highest
amount of damages available under Title VII's capped damages provi-
sion. 78 Yet, she ultimately did not prevail. The district court granted the
employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law, finding that Tatum did
not prove that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive under the
164. Id. at 846.
165. 411 F.3d 955, 958 (8th Cir. 2005).
166. Id. at 957. The administrator of the office stated that she did not approve of some of
the employees' activities and found the activities to be inappropriate, but a verbal warning









175. Id. at 958.
176. Id.
177. Cf Tatum, 411 F.3d at 958; Duncan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir.
2002).
178. Tatum, 411 F.3d at 958.
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totality of the circumstances test.1 79 The three previous cases reveal the ef-
fect that Duncan has had in developing precedent in the Eighth Circuit.
D. Sexual Harassment Effects Created By the Current Judicial Treatment
of Title VII Cases
In order to understand the evolution of harassment from society to the
workplace to the courtroom, the phenomenon of workplace sexual harass-
ment needs to be examined. The following section discusses the numerous
problems that result in the workplace and society from the current judicial
application of the totality of the circumstances test in Title VII cases. First,
this section will reflect on how Title VII impacts the workplace. Second, the
societal problems that result from the judicial application of the test will be
presented.
1. Impact in the Workplace
Reports reveal that "[b]etween one quarter and one half of all women
have been sexually harassed sometime during their working lives."
'1 80
Moreover, the impact of sexual harassment on the workplace is costly for
both employers and employees.' 18 A study of federal employees estimated
that sexual harassment cost the federal government (as an employer) $327
million over a two-year period.182 Additionally, employers incur substantial
costs because sexual harassment results in "reduced productivity, low mo-
rale, absenteeism, employee turnover, litigation costs-damages, [and] attor-
ney fees."'
183
Furthermore, the financial loss to victimized employees may be hard to
estimate adequately because many incidents of sexual harassment are not
reported. 184 Also, a problem in calculating the costs exists because the ef-
fects of sexual harassment may take years to surface. 185 In only a two year
179. Id.
180. BARBARA A. GUTEK, SEX AND THE WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR
AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN, AND ORGANIZATIONS 58 (1985).
181. See UNITED STATES EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, SEX DISCRIMINATION ISSUES A-2, A-3 (1998) [hereinafter
U.S.E.E.O.C.].
182. USMSPB, supra note 116, at 26. These results are from the years 1992 to 1994.
183. U.S.E.E.O.C., supra note 181, at A-2. A "study in Working Woman magazine states
that sexual harassment costs a typical Fortune 500 company $6.7 million in absenteeism, low
morale, lower productivity and employee turnover." Id. at A-2-A-3.
184. See USMSPB, supra note 116, at 35 & tbl.l 1.
185. Cf BEINER, supra note 4, at 186-89 (citing Bonnie S. Dansky & Dean G. Kilpatrick,
Effects of Sexual Harassment, in SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND
TREATMENT 164, 166-67 (William O'Donohue ed., 1997)). A study of the long term effects
of sexual harassment showed that the average time elapsed between experiencing the ha-
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period, a 1994 survey showed that sexual harassment cost federal em-
ployees $4.4 million dollars in lost wages. 186 The impact on employees who
have experienced sexual harassment varies, including using sick leave, us-
ing annual leave, taking leave without pay, receiving or needing medical
and/or emotional help, being reassigned or fired, transferring to a new job,
quitting without a new job, or suffering a decline in productivity. 187 This
survey estimated the costs to be as follows: "U]ob turnover $24.7 million,
[s]ick leave $14.9 million, [i]ndividual productivity $93.7 million, [and]
[w]orkgroup productivity $193.8 million," totaling a cost of $327.1 million
for harassment in the federal government alone.
188
In addition to the economic costs it imposes, sexual harassment ex-
acerbates workplace sex segregation. 189 As a result of sex segregation, lower
level jobs are filled by young women and supervisors usually are men.' 90
The segregation is so prevalent that "approximately [fifty] percent of all
workers would need to switch to different occupational categories to
achieve the even distribution of men and women across occupations."'
' 9 1
Moreover, segregation in the workplace does not translate to separate but
equal treatment because females "generally [have] lower status in society,
garner less pay, and have less prestige than male-dominated jobs."' 92 Fur-
thermore, research shows that the "glass ceiling" still exists in America;
women are still "targets of discrimination at work, both in terms of earnings
and promotions to positions of power, such as executive positions in corpo-
rations."'193 It has been estimated that women earn twenty-five percent less
than men. 194 In 2004, the United States Department of Labor reported that
the disparity in wages between males and females is found in various fields
rassment and its effects was eleven years. Id. Accordingly, there is a lack of correlation be-
tween the harassing incident and the later resulting effects.
186. USMSPB, supra note 116, at 26.
187. Id. at 26, tbl.6. The cited table shows the "[p]ercentage of respondents who expe-
rienced sexual harassment and took or experienced the indicated action[s] [between] 1987
and 1994." Id.
188. Id. at 26.
189. GuTEK, supra note 180, at 39-40.
190. Id.
191. Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, Sex Discrimination: The Psychological Approach, in
SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 155, 165 (Faye J. Crosby, Margaret S. Stockdale &
S. Ann Ropp eds., 2007) (citing IRENE PADAVIC & BARBARA RESKIN, WOMEN AND MEN AT
WORK (2d ed. 2002)).
192. Id. at 165.
193. Id. at 158. See also Deborah L. Rhode & Joan C. Williams, Legal Perspectives on
Employment Discrimination, in SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 235 (Faye J. Cros-
by, Margaret S. Stockdale & S. Ann Ropp eds., 2007).
194. Barbara R. Bergmann, Discrimination through the Economist's Eye, in SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 213, 218 (Faye J. Crosby, Margaret S. Stockdale & S.
Ann Ropp eds., 2007).
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of work. 195 "For example, among lawyers, women earn 73% of what men
earn; among CEOs, 70%; among bartenders, 81%; and among nurses,
87%. " 196 Shockingly, the report discovered that even female dishwashers
make an average of $2,000 less per year than male dishwashers. 97 As a
matter of fact, in 2000, women only made 71.5 cents for every dollar made
by a man.'
98
Moreover, sexual harassment occurs in the legal profession. 99 Is sex-
ual harassment law effective if the harassing behavior is fostered and tole-
rated throughout the legal profession by those who are supposed to uphold
the law? Women practicing law reported that they heard sexist jokes and
remarks, were informally referred to by first name, were asked about their
professional status, and received compliments about appearance rather than
achievement. 200 Another study reported that although there were few differ-
ences between male and female lawyers' speech patterns, both male and
201female clients demonstrated greater deference to male lawyers. In addi-
tion, female attorneys indicated that judges addressed male attorneys diffe-
rently-giving them more attention and credibility-because of their gend-
er.20 2 Findings such as these support the notion that gender discrimination (a
Title VII violation on the basis of "sex") affects the legal community and
that the discrimination extends from the courtroom to client interactions.
Because sexual harassment perpetuates the submissive status of women,
decreases work productivity, and is costly for both employers and em-
ployees, it is in the best interest of employers to reduce, correct, and prevent
195. Rhode & Williams, supra note 193, at 239 (citing U.S. Department of Labor, Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics, Household Data, Annual Averages (2004)).
196. Id.
197. Id. (citing U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Household Data,
Annual Averages (2004)).
198. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Watched Variable Improves: On Eliminating Sex
Discrimination in Employment, in SEX DIsCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE 295 (Faye J.
Crosby, Margaret S. Stockdale, & S. Ann Ropp eds., 2007) (citing American Association of
University Women Educational Foundation, Women at Work, tbl. State-by-state data on
women's and men's educational attainment and earnings by educational attainment, (2003),
available at http://www.aauw.org/research/statedata/table-data.pdf). Women participating in
this study had a four-year degree and worked full-time year round, but they still made less
than men. Id.
199. Susan R. Furr, Men and Women in Cross-Gender Careers, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
SEX, GENDER, AND JOBS: ISSUES AND SOLUTIONS 47 (Louis Diamant & Jo Ann Lee eds.,
2002) (citing Patricia MacCorquodale & Gary Jensen, Women in the Law: Partners or To-
kens?, 7 GENDER & SOC'Y, 582, 582-93 (1993)). See also id. at 50 (citing Bryna Bogoch,
Gendered Lawyering: Difference and Dominance in Lawyer-Client Interaction, 31 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 677, 677-712 (1997)).
200. Id.
201. Id. (citing Bogoch, supra note 199, at 677-712). This study focused on the domin-
ance expressed in male and female speech patterns. Id.
202. Furr, supra note 199, at 50-51.
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problems of sexual harassment before the harassment reaches the level of
severity actionable under Title VII.
2 0 3
2. Influence on Society
An interesting Saint Louis University Law Journal comment reads,
"Little girls grow up believing they can do anything. However, do we want
to tell those same young girls that they can grow up to do anything they
choose, yet they cannot complain about harassment... ?,,24 This statement
questions the values that society is teaching children about sexual harass-
ment and gender; specifically, it suggests what society teaches little girls
about entering into workplaces that are traditionally male oriented.20 5 Often
children are told that they can grow up to be anything and to "dream big."
The current state of the law begs the question: is there equal opportunity for
our future generations to "dream big" and to do so without the reality of
sexual harassment?
Sociocultural theory suggests that sexual harassment is a reflection of
the "differential distribution of power and status" between men and women
in society.0 6 Generally, sexual harassment is used as a mechanism for
maintaining male dominance over women in the workplace and in socie-
ty.207 This view supports the notion that "society rewards males for assertive
and aggressive sexual behavior and rewards women for being acquiescent,
compliant, and passive., 20 8 Psychologists hypothesize that the power strug-
gle existing between the sexes is one of the most important determinants of
209societal attitudes regarding gender stereotypes and sex discrimination.
Stereotypical, psychological assumptions based on gender create sex stereo-
types in society that spill over into the workplace and ultimately result in
males being the preferred sex in employment contexts.210 If sexual harass-
ment law reduced workplace sex stereotyping by providing equal opportuni-
ty to women, the occurrence of societal stereotyping would be minimized.
On the other hand, if society refused to embrace sex stereotypes, sexual
discrimination and harassment in the workplace would be minimized. It is
203. See generally U.S.E.E.O.C., supra note 181.
204. Emily E. Rushing, Comment, So Much for Equality in the Workplace: The Ever-
Changing Standards For Sexual Harassment Claims Under Title VII, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1389, 1409 (2001).
205. Id.
206. GUTEK, supra note 180, at 14 (citing Sandra S. Tangri, Martha R. Burt & Leanor B.
Johnson, Sexual Harassment at Work: Three Explanatory Models, 38 J. OF SOC. ISSUEs 33
(1982)).
207. Id. at 14-15.
208. Id. at 15.
209. Glick & Fiske, supra note 191, at 159.
210. Id. at 170.
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unclear whether society is creating the spillover or inadequate equal oppor-
tunity and ineffective sexual harassment law is prolonging the problem.
Yet, sexual harassment persists and its victims are left with inadequate
remedies. Twenty percent of victims of sexual harassment are hesitant to
take formal action, because they "[do] not think anything [will] be done. 21'
Unremedied sexual harassment leaves members of society with serious is-
sues, such as emotional and physical problems, to resolve at their own
cost. 212 For example, lowered self-esteem can result from a targeted em-
ployee feeling as if his or her physical qualities may have been the basis for
hiring or promotion rather than his or her work capabilities and achieve-
ments.213 The psychological effects of sexual harassment vary depending on
the severity of the harassment but include: anger, fear, depression, anxiety,
helplessness, and vulnerability.214 If untreated, the psychological effects can
lead to "[a]nxiety disorders including panic disorder and generalized anxiety
disorder; somatoform disorders, various forms of depression, and [even]
post traumatic stress disorder., 215 Furthermore, physical symptoms may
result from sexual harassment such as digestive and appetite disorders, sleep
problems, headaches, and uncontrollable crying spells.
216
As previously mentioned, victims of sex discrimination are often reluc-
tant to take action; one reason is that the cost of litigation is high and the
probability of success is low. 217 Discrimination lawsuits also frequently
restrict personal relationships and resources and may continue for years at a
time, costing thousands of dollars. 1 8 Another reason for this reluctance is
that people do not like to be portrayed as victims because "it erodes their
sense of control and self-esteem and involves the unpleasantness of identi-
fying a perpetrator. 2 1 9 To summarize, unremedied sexual harassment de-
trimentally impacts society and leaves victims physically and psychologi-
cally impaired without compensation or rehabilitation.
211. USMSPB, supra note 116, at 35 & tbl.11. This table shows the reasons why victims
chose not to take formal action in response to unwanted sexual attention in 1994. Id.
212. Cf BEINER, supra note 4, at 186-87.
213. Id. at 186.
214. Id. at 187 (citing Barbara A. Gutek & Mary P. Koss, Changed Women and Changed
Organizations: Consequences of and Coping with Sexual Harassment, 42 J. VOCATIONAL
BEHAV. 28,30 (1993)).
215. Id. (citing Jane Goodman-Delahunty & William E. Foote, Compensation for Pain,
Suffering, and Other Psychological Injuries: The Impact of Daubert on Employment Discrim-
ination Claims, 13 BEHAV. ScL & L. 183, 195 (1995)).
216. Id.
217. Rhode & Williams, supra note 193, at 243-44. A national survey revealed that "of
those who reported unfair treatment in the workplace, about a third did nothing." Id.
218. Id. at 244.
219. Id. at 243.
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Victims are thus forced to choose between seeking costly legal redress
that will likely be unsuccessful, continuing to work in a hostile environ-
ment, or resigning from their employment. The right to work in an envi-
ronment free from harassment and to have the harassment remedied if it
does occur are both underlying purposes of Title VII. 221 Overturning jury
verdicts as a matter of law obstructs the statute's purposes from being effec-




Over ninety percent of employment discrimination claims are settled
before trial.222 Courts use the procedural motions of summary judgment and
judgment as a matter of law as a means to resist trial on the merits and to
manipulate the outcome of Title VII claims. 3 Judgments as a matter of law
can be a helpful procedural device for the judiciary, but the application of
this device can become problematic when it is inappropriately applied or
applied in questionably close cases.224 Different theories have been pro-
posed to explain the trend of granting summary judgment and overturning
verdicts as a matter of law.22 5 The theories that have been proposed are as
follows: judicial hostility towards employment discrimination plaintiffs,
judicial disbelief that sexual discrimination causes an actionable injury,
judicial belief that a certain amount of sex discrimination and harassment
are acceptable in the workplace, judicial mistrust of juries, the fear of re-
duced judicial efficiency or overloaded court dockets, and lastly, the possi-
bility that employers have more financial assistance to provide more aggres-
sive litigation tactics than a targeted employee.226 Regardless of what the
underlying reason may be for the judicial restraint exercised in Title VII
cases, the fact is that few Title VII plaintiffs ever get their day in court.
227
220. See 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1 (2008).
221. See BEINER, supra note 4, at 180; see also infra Parts III.A & B which provide pro-
posals for reformation.
222. Beiner, supra note 7, at 96 (citing Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394,
1396 (7th Cir. 1997)).
223. See generally Beiner, supra note 7, at 71; see also Medina, supra note 4, at 311.
224. See Medina, supra note 5, at 316. Medina finds that excessive use of summary
judgment to minimize litigation costs and to prevent meritless claims is unnecessary because
procedural safeguards already exist under Title VII. Id. These safeguards-the EEOC proce-
dural requirements, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 11 and 12, and the restraint of
capped damages created by the Civil Rights Act of 1991-are sufficient to eject frivolous
claims of harassment. Id. See generally Beiner, supra note 7, at 71.
225. Medina, supra note 5, at 315-16, 337-38; see also Beiner, supra note 5, at 807.
226. Medina, supra note 5, at 315-16, 337-38; see also Miller, supra note 72, at 1046.
227. See United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Sexual Harassment
Charges EEOC & FEPAs Combined: FY 1997 - FY 2008, available at
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The result of keeping sexual harassment and discrimination cases from a
jury determination is that targets of sexual harassment and discrimination
are unjustifiably left without a remedy.2 8
Since the enactment of Title VII, the standard of actionable legal ha-
rassment has evolved in the court system.229 Courts currently evade the se-
vere or pervasive standard and the totality of the circumstances test by over-
turning jury verdicts on appeal. 230 First, this section proposes that future
courts should refuse to overturn jury verdicts as a matter of law under the
reasonable person standard because juries are reasonable people and the
procedure is constitutionally questionable. 3 Second, this section proposes
that the overturning of jury verdicts and the disparate treatment of sexual
harassment cases by the judiciary could be reduced if Duncan cases were
reversed,232 judges were required to attend legal education courses on sexual
23323harassment, more female judges were appointed,234 and additional federal
legislation and regulations were enacted.235
A. Discontinue Overturning Jury Verdicts as a Matter of Law
Overturning a jury verdict for a plaintiff is the most severe judicial in-
vasion of the totality of the circumstances test, because a jury has already
decided, using the same test, that the misconduct did create a hostile envi-
236ronment. This reversal is problematic in the context of sexual harassment
cases because the test employs a reasonable person standard. In addition, the
standard under the totality of the circumstances test is both objective and
subjective, which makes it difficult for an appellate judge to determine an
employee's perception of the work environment from the trial record
alone.237 When judicial intervention results in a jury's verdict being over-
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.html. (In 2008, there were 13,867 receipts of sexual ha-
rassment claims, but only 3395 merit resolutions).
228. BEINER, supra note 4, at 20. Studies have shown that Title VII plaintiffs "fare better
before juries than judges." Id. In addition, the mere fact that juries have found for the plain-
tiff and judges on appeal have subsequently reversed the verdict suggests that juries are more
pro-plaintiff than judges.
229. Cf Burke, supra note 10, at 591.
230. See infra Part III.A. 1.
231. See infra Part III.A.1-2.
232. See infra Part III.B.1.
233. See infra Part III.B.2.
234. See infra Part III.B.3.
235. See infra Part III.B.4.
236. See supra Part I and notes 4-8. Juries should create the reasonable person standard
because juries are the "better gauge of community and national norms" rather than Article III
judges, because they are the actual participants in the workforce. See Medina, supra note 5,
at 317.
237. BEINER, supra note 4, at 102.
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turned, many different issues arise. This section will first discuss the judi-
ciary's possible misidentification of the reasonable person as a judge instead
of the jury. Next, this section will reveal how overturning jury verdicts as a
matter of law creates fundamental constitutional issues.
1. The Duncan Problem238and Misidentification of the Reasonable
Person
A study of the United States Courts of Appeals revealed that in most
Title VII cases courts did not mention the reasonable person standard when
analyzing the severe or pervasive element.2 39 Reasonable people, in the
form of juries, have found conduct such as the alleged harassment in Dun-
can to be severe or pervasive; yet judges reverse these verdicts, holding that
such harassing behavior is not severe or pervasive enough to be legally ac-
tionable.24° In Duncan the appellate court reasoned, "[A]s a matter of law,
she has failed to show that these occurrences in the aggregate were so se-
vere and extreme that a reasonable person would find that the terms or con-
ditions of Duncan's employment had been altered., 241 Both this statement
and the court's holding-overturning the jury verdict as a matter of law-
propose that no reasonable jury could find the behavior severe or pervasive
under the applicable standard.242 The court's finding is illogical because
twelve jurors previously decided that the conduct was severe or pervasive
under the totality of the circumstances test. The court in Duncan wrongly
overturned the jury's verdict.
The Duncan problem is the most extreme form of judicial disregard of
the totality of the circumstances test. 243 When a judge overturns a jury ver-
238. "The Duncan problem" is a term that will be used here to illustrate the issue of
judges overturning jury verdicts as a matter of law in Title VII cases; it not only refers to
Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002), but also to any appellate
case in which the jury has found for the plaintiff under the totality of the circumstances test
and a judge subsequently overturns the verdict as a matter of law.
239. Beiner, supra note 5, at 808 (citing Ann Juliano & Stewart J. Schwab, The Sweep of
Sexual Harassment Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 548, 584-85 (2001)). Professor Beiner finds
that the results of this study are "odd given Supreme Court precedent." Id. The Juliano &
Schwab study also found that pretrial motion in sexual harassment cases were increasingly
being used to dispose of cases. Id.
240. See, e.g., Tatum v. Ark. Dep't of Health, 411 F.3d 955, 958 (8th Cir. 2005). See also
supra Part II.C.2. Duncan will be referenced many times in this section of the note because it
is a primary example of a court evading the totality of the circumstances test. Duncan v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002).
241. Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934.
242. See id. at 936. This citation directs the reader to the holding of Duncan; the court
obviously did not state that its own holding was illogical. My conclusion demonstrates how
courts are misidentifying the reasonable person in Title VII cases like Duncan.
243. See supra notes 4-8 for examples of the other types of judicial disregard of the
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dict as a matter of law in a Title VII case based on sex, the judge is holding
that the jury was wrong as a matter of law. Essentially, the judge who over-
turns the jury's verdict is deciding that the twelve members of the jury-
who heard the live testimony and determined that the facts of the case sup-
ported the cause of action-were unreasonable. Therefore, the judge or the
appellate panel asserts that they are the "reasonable person"-not the jurors.
Moreover, in Duncan the trial judge who heard the live testimony did not
overturn the jury's verdict, which implies that the appellate court is suggest-
ing that both the trial judge and the jury assessed the evidence improperly.
In addition to disregarding the jurors' assessment of the facts, the Dun-
can problem creates faulty precedent for later courts to follow. 244 Faulty
precedent is created when a court employs one or more of the previously
mentioned devices 245 to evade the totality of the circumstances test-
consequently, creating a line of dubious precedent in a circuit. To explain,
Duncan allows courts to grant summary judgment motions for employers
under the severe or pervasive standard in questionable cases. This judicial
intervention that occurs before a jury gets the case also results in misappli-
cation of the totality of the circumstances test.
Duncan is a key example of the judiciary evading the totality of the
circumstances test.246 First, the court minimized the severity of the miscon-
duct by characterizing the conduct as "a single request for a relationship,...
four or five isolated incidents of [a coworker] briefly touching her hand, a
request to draw a planter, and teasing," thus omitting the charity arrest and
the hostility Duncan experienced.247 In addition, Duncan dismissed the Su-
totality of the circumstances test.
244. Cf BEINER, supra note 4, at 21. Professor Beiner discusses the creation of faulty
precedent finding that the "[s]ubsequent courts will use one extremely close case to justify
summary disposition in succeeding close cases in the same circuit, thereby expanding that
case's reach." Id. The Shepard's Report of Duncan reveals that faulty precedent will also be
created in other circuits. See Shepard's Report, supra note 143.
245. See supra notes 4-8.
246. Shepard's Report, supra note 143. Furthermore, another illustration of the backlash
that Duncan created is Tatum v. Ark. Dep't of Health, 411 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2005). See also
supra Part II.C (discussing the facts of Tatum). Comparable to Duncan, in Tatum, the district
court deprived Tatum of justice-overturning the jury's verdict as a matter of law and evad-
ing the totality of the circumstances test by: (1) misinterpreting "severe or pervasive" as
"severe and pervasive"; and (2) reversing the verdict for Tatum. Id. at 958 (emphasis added).
In order to prevent the undermining of a plaintiff's right to trial, "if reasonable minds could
differ regarding the interpretation of important evidence," a motion for summary judgment,
directed verdict, or judgment as a matter of law should fail. Miller, supra note 72, at 1036-
37. The district court should not have granted the employer's motion for judgment as a mat-
ter of law because a reasonable jury already found for Tatum; the motion should have failed.
247. Keller & Tracy, supra note 6, at 269 (citing Duncan, 300 F.3d at 935). Keller and
Tracy state:
The dissent skillfully identified some of these shortcomings of the majority opi-
nion's disposition of this case. Judge Arnold found the jury's determination rea-
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preme Court's directive and misconstrued the intent of Harris by quoting
only a narrow portion of the dicta from the case. 24 8 Finally, the court cited
Baskerville v. Culligan International, Co., an extremely deplorable case, to
reduce the appearance of severity. 249 After carefully analyzing the steps that
the court used to evaluate the facts of Duncan, it is apparent that the legal
standard applied by the court was not the same totality of the circumstances
test that the Supreme Court envisioned.25 0 The fact that the case could be
considered a close call should have signaled to the Court that the jury
should have decided the case and that judgment as a matter of law was in-
25appropriate. 51 In addition to disregarding Supreme Court directives con-
ceming the totality of the circumstances test, overturning jury verdicts as a
matter of law under a reasonable person standard raises constitutional con-
cerns.
2. Constitutional Issues Arising from Misusing Judgment as a Matter
ofLaw
Courts inappropriately grant judgments as a matter of law in the con-
text of hostile environment claims. The use of this procedural tool is, argua-
bly, an encroachment on the plaintiffs constitutional rights-specifically,
the plaintiff's right to a jury trial, the right to have his or her day in court,
and the right to an impartial fact finder.252 Before analyzing the constitu-
sonable and supported by ample evidence; throughout his discussion he recog-
nized appropriate inferences that the jury could have drawn to support its ver-
dict, and noted, quoting circuit precedent, that because there "is no bright line
between sexual harassment and merely unpleasant conduct,.. . a jury's decision
must generally stand unless there is trial error."
Id. (citing Duncan, 300 F.3d at 936-38).
248. See Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934. Duncan cites the rule from Harris, stating, "To clear
the high threshold of actionable harm, Duncan has to show that 'the workplace is permeated
with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult."' Id. (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys.
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). This single quote of dicta from Harris allowed the Duncan
court to manipulate the Supreme Court Justice's instructions regarding the totality of the
circumstances test. See also supra Part II. In Part II of this note, the overall implication and
the Supreme Court's intention for the actionable level of harassment were provided.
249. See Duncan, 300 F.3d at 934 (citing Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428,
430 (7th Cir. 1995)). In Baskerville, the court found that sexual misconduct occurring over a
seven month period was not actionable because it did not make the workplace "hellish."
Baskerville, 50 F.3d at 430. Arguably, the court misapplied the severe or pervasive standard,
implementing a hellish standard-a standard the Supreme Court never even referenced, let
alone adopted.
250. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(b) (2008); see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17 (1993).
251. Cf Miller, supra note 72, at 1067.
252. See supra Part II.C. See also McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 1981)
(citing Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1965)). See Miller, supra note 72,
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tional considerations, one must recognize that most sexual harassment
claims consist of conflicting recollections of alleged misconduct. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that the question-whether an environment is severe
or pervasive-requires many factual issues to be decided by the fact finder
in order for either party to prevail.
To begin the analysis, judgment as a matter of law after trial is theoret-
ically not an infringement on a litigant's constitutional rights, because a
plaintiff supposedly has had his or her day in court. The case will not be
taken from the jury unless the court finds-as a matter of law-that only
one reasonable verdict was possible.253 Arguably, this is why overturning
jury verdicts in hostile environment cases under the severe or pervasive
standard constitutes a constitutional violation. Cases like Duncan-where
the jury has found that the misconduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive
as to violate Title VII-suggest that the verdict for the plaintiff was not un-
reasonable. As a matter of fact, more than twelve reasonable people-the
jury, the plaintiffs lawyer, the target of the harassment, and the trial
judge-all agreed under a reasonable person standard that the verdict should
be for the plaintiff. Therefore, in Title VII cases such as Duncan, appellate
courts should rarely hold the jury verdict unreasonable as a matter or law.254
Furthermore, as evidenced through social science research, people
generally agree about what types of misconduct are severe or pervasive
enough as to be considered sexual harassment, and their judgments tracked
the legal standard of severe or pervasive. Therefore, jury verdicts finding
that actionable harassment occurred are reasonable and should not be over-
turned as a matter of law.255 If verdicts in cases like Duncan are reasonable,
then the courts have taken away a Title VII plaintiffs day in court by re-
versing the jury verdict as a matter of law. This amounts to a constitutional
violation.
Courts should not use judgment as a matter of law to determine wheth-
er a jury correctly assessed the severity or pervasiveness of the alleged ha-
at 1061-62, 1071. Similarly, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 38 is consistent with the consti-
tutional requirements of a plaintiffs rights to a day in court, stating, "[t]he right of trial by
jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution--or as provided by a federal
statute-is preserved to the parties inviolate." FED. R. CIv. P. 38.
253. Miller, supra note 72, at 1090-91. Professor Miller concludes that under Rule 50(a)
a party's rights to a day in court and resolution by jury were not compromised if the directed
verdict (judgment as a matter of law) "only deprived the losing party of the possibility of an
unreasonable verdict." Id. at 1091.
254. See, e.g., BEINER, supra note 4, at 30; Keller & Tracy, supra note 6. See generally
Duncan, 300 F.3d 928 (8th Cir. 2002). Additionally, the Duncan holding has been criticized
by many scholars for its application of judgment as a matter of law finding that the conduct
was not severe or pervasive.
255. See USMSPB, supra note 116, at 7, tbl.1.
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rassment because it is the jury's duty to determine the facts.256 The right to a
jury trial is a substantive right, and courts should not trespass on this right
unless a jury's verdict is not supported by real evidence.257 Under the severe
or pervasive standard, the jury determines whether they believe the plain-
tiff's or the defendant's version of the facts; therefore, the issue is a deter-
mination of facts under the applicable legal standard, and courts should
leave it to the jury to decide. Conversely, judgment as a matter of law after a
jury has rendered its verdict is appropriate in Title VII cases only if the jury
"misinterpreted the instructions as to the rules of law, misapplied them...
[or] when it appears that there was no real evidence in support of any essen-
tial fact.' '258 In summary, juries should be permitted to decide whether the
misconduct in any given case is sufficiently severe or pervasive to a reason-
able person to be actionable because the function of juries is to draw infe-
rences for either party when one or more facts are in dispute.
259
Further, judges should not undermine the safeguards that the jury pro-
vides to litigants by reversing jury verdicts as a matter of law in Title VII
cases. Frequent use of judgment as a matter of law "threatens longstanding
constitutional values"; therefore, courts should defer to the use of jury tri-
al. 260 Furthermore, "[t]o honor the rights to a day in court and to jury trial..
. judgment as a matter of law ... [should] be closely scrutinized and con-
stricted since the safety valve of an opportunity to present one's case in a
complete and live format is absent. ,,261 Thus, courts should not overturn
Title VII cases on the basis that the alleged harassment was not severe or
pervasive because if a jury has found that the alleged harassment was severe
262
or pervasive, then the court would be undermining the role of the jury.
There is a constitutional guarantee that requires that a "court cannot dis-
pense with a verdict, or disregard one when given, and itself pass on the
issues of fact., 263 A court should not question a Title VII plaintiff's credibil-
ity or the severity of the alleged harassment after a jury who witnessed the
live testimony has already decided the matter.
256. Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 378-79 (1913).
257. Id. at 378. "[The Seventh Amendment's] aim is not to preserve mere matters of
form and procedure, but substance of right." Id. (quoting Walker v. New Mexico & S.P.R.
Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596 (1897)).
258. Id. at 379.
259. Cf Miller, supra note 72, at 1091-92.
260. Id. at 1093.
261. ld. at 1133.
262. Cf Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 380 (1913) (stating that if the "cir-
cuit court of appeals itself determined the facts, without a new trial ... it assumed a power it
did not possess, and cut off the plaintiff's right to have the facts settled by the verdict of a
jury.").
263. Id. at 387-88.
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Another constitutional issue that arises in overturning jury verdicts as a
matter of law in Title VII cases is the due process right to an impartial fact
finder.264 The fact that there may be some judicial hostility towards Title
VII plaintiffs makes the impartiality of at least some judges questionable.265
If judges are permitting sexual harassment in their courtroom, or even more
outrageously, participating in some of the misconduct, they are not impartial
adjudicators in sexual harassment cases. 266 This judicial hostility theory was
proved true in Catchpole v. Brannon.26 7 The apparent judicial hostility to-
wards Title VII cases suggests that the current judicial treatment of sex dis-
crimination cases infringes on the right to a jury trial guaranteed by the Se-
venth Amendment. 68 Thus, cases in which the jury finds for the plaintiff
but a judge or appellate panel subsequently overturns the verdict are highly
suspicious. This type of Duncan problem must be addressed by the judi-
ciary.
B. Possible Solutions to Decrease Judicial Restraint in Title VII Cases
The current judicial treatment of Title VII cases not only leaves vic-
tims of harassment to deal with the effects of harassment by themselves but
also exacerbates the existing problems that sexual harassment causes in the
workplace and society.269 In order to reform the current standard of judicial
intervention that leads to overturning of jury verdicts as a matter of law,
change must occur. The following section proposes judicial and legislative
modifications that may help prevent and reduce the Duncan problem. This
section first proposes that Duncan cases should be reversed and that, except
in rare cases, jury verdicts should be allowed to stand. Second, this section
discusses the benefits of continuing judicial education concerning current
sexual harassment issues. Next, this section suggests that appointing more
female judges may help remedy the Duncan problem. Lastly, this section
concludes by proposing that Title VII and the EEOC regulations and proce-
dures should be amended.
264. See U.S. CONST. amend. V-VI. See also McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 657 (6th
Cir. 1981) (quoting Kiernan v. Van Schaik, 347 F.2d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1965) (finding that
"the right to an impartial jury in civil cases is inherent in the Seventh Amendment's preser-
vation of a 'right to trial by jury' and the Fifth Amendment's guarantee that 'no person shall
be denied of life, liberty or property without due process of law"')).
265. See supra Part II.C.1.
266. Supra Part IJ.C.I.
267. See 36 Cal. App. 4th 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995). This case was previously discussed
in Part II.C. 1.
268. See supra Part II.C. 1.
269. See supra Part II.D.1.
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1. Reverse Duncan Cases & Let the Jury Verdict Stand
The immediate solution to the Duncan problem would be to reverse
Duncan and its progeny, and let the jury verdicts stand. This solution seems
simple, but the costs involved for the plaintiff to continue to win on appeal
may render this solution unlikely.270 If wealthy defendants-likely corpora-
tions-continue to appeal Title VII verdicts, the likelihood that a working
class employee could continue to financially support the litigation is doubt-
ful. Absent extreme circumstances, the jury verdict should be the final ver-
dict in Title VII cases that are being appealed on the severe or pervasive
standard because juries provide the best representation of community
norms. 271 Letting jury verdicts stand would prevent personal judicial view-
points from influencing the reasonable person standard.272 Moreover, letting
jury verdicts stand would likely better comport with the social science re-
search that finds that people perceive sexual harassment to encompass a
broader scope of misconduct than does the judiciary.273
Another reason courts should not overturn jury verdicts on appeal is
that research shows that people are concerned with procedural justice.274 In
order to ensure that society does not lose faith in the justice system or the
ability to affect the legal process, judges should not undermine jury verdicts
in Title VII cases under the reasonable person standard. The message con-
veyed to members of society by this constitutionally questionable procedur-
al device is that they are not reasonable. This type of message may result in
270. In addition to paying fees for their own legal representation, a Title VII plaintiff
who does not prevail may even be required to pay the prevailing defendant's costs. See
FARRELL ET AL., 21A FEDERAL PROCEDURE, LAWYER'S EDITION § 50:1214 (2008) (finding
that most courts presumptively hold that a Title VII defendant is entitled to costs). Moreover,
a plaintiff might incur indirect financial costs from engaging in litigation, such as time off
work, child care, attorney's fees, etc. See also Theodore Eisenberg & Steward J. Schwab,
Double Standard on Appeal: An Empirical Analysis of Employment Discrimination Cases in
the U.S. Court of Appeals at 1, http://www.findjustice.com/sub/civil-justice.jsp (follow "Ei-
senberg-Schwab Report" hyperlink). This study reports that plaintiffs only win on appeal in
5.8% of cases. Id. On the contrary, defendants win on appeal almost half of the time. Id.
These statistics may deter plaintiffs from pursuing an appeal due to the risk of loss involved.
271. See BEINER, supra note 4, at 30.
272. See id Letting the juries decide would also help employers. Id. To explain, if these
hostile environment cases were allowed to go to the jury (thus, developing a community
standard), employers would be able to better assess employee complaints and prevent offen-
sive behaviors. Id.
273. See id.; cf USMSPB, supra note 116, at 7 tbl.l.
274. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Margaret S. Stockdale & Faye J. Crosby, A Critical Look at
Organizational Responses to and Remedies for Sex Discrimination, in SEX DISCRIMINATION
IN THE WORKPLACE 273, 278 (Faye J. Crosby, Margaret S. Stockdale, & S. Ann Ropp eds.,
2007). The studies conducted found that although "well-intentioned policies and procedures"




a loss of faith in the legal system, which could cause an array of prob-
lems.275
Reversing cases that cause the Duncan problem would result in correct
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent.276 Professor Theresa Beiner ar-
gues that small steps work best for accomplishing long lasting change.277
Besides promoting procedural justice and community norms, reversing
Duncan cases would set better precedent and prevent further judicial misap-
plication of the totality of the circumstances test.278 Reversing Duncan cases
will not be an easy feat, but it would be a small step in the right direction.
2. Continuing Legal Education for Judges
One solution to bridge the gap between what judges and the common
worker find to be sexual harassment is to require judges to attend continuing
legal education courses that focus on current legal barriers and social
science research. If judges used social science research, the severe or perva-
sive standard would develop into a true reasonable person standard rather
than the personalized standard of a judge or judges.279 Continuing education
for judges may prove beneficial to Title VII plaintiffs and may help to pro-
vide more consistent judicial decisions regarding what type of misconduct
meets the severe or pervasive standard. Additionally, this continuing educa-
tion for judges may also bring the judicial restraint problem to judges' atten-
tion, which may help reduce the frequency of its occurrence.
3. Appoint More Female Judges
An increase in the number of female judges would likely reduce the
occurrence of the Duncan problem. The current lack of female judges may
encourage the oppression of women in and out of the court room. 280 In the
past, courts have analyzed the question of who is the reasonable person-
275. Cf id. at 276. The types of problems that may result from such lack of faith in the
legal process are: a further resistance to report meritorious sexual harassment claims which
would result in even more unremedied victims; victims taking justice into their own hands
for lack of a legal remedy; and possible disregard and disdain for the laws and the legal sys-
tem.
276. See supra Part II.C.
277. BEINER, supra note 4, at 40. Professor Beiner finds that "[a]bsent a sweeping recon-
ceptualization of sexual harassment by the courts, small steps tend to provide the best hope
of affecting actual results in real cases." Id.
278. Cf id. at 28-29.
279. Id at 30, 40-45. Social science research "provide[s] information that supports the
majority position and helps substantiate the reactions of most workers." Id.
280. Cf BEINER, supra note 4, at 30.
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the reasonable man, woman, or victim. 281 In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc., the Supreme Court directed the courts to use the reasonable
person standard, considering all the circumstances in a subjective and objec-
282tive manner. The problem with applying the reasonable person standard
in Title VII cases is that these cases are not proceeding past summary judg-
ment, or if they do, they are being overturned by judicial panels as a matter
of law on appeal.283 Therefore, logistically the reasonable person in a Title
VII case is a judge or the appellate panel.284 The problem with a judge or
panel acting as the reasonable person is that the objective viewpoint be-
comes that of the judge.285
Because the majority of judges are male,286 the objective viewpoint
generally becomes narrowed to a man's viewpoint. To illustrate this con-
cept, research indicates that women experience harassment twelve times
more frequently than men and that the problem is "a far more serious prob-
lem for women than for men." 287 Logically, if a woman is more likely to
experience sexual harassment, it is more likely that a female judge will be
able to better perceive--drawing from personal experiences-what level of
harassment is severe or pervasive to a woman.288
Additionally, women judges may render different judgments in analyz-
ing the severe or pervasive standard, because women typically identify more
behavior to be sexual harassment than men.289 For example, Judge Posner,
in Baskerville v. Culligan International Company, found that the harassing
behavior was not severe or pervasive explaining:
281. See id. at 47-49. See also David Schultz, From Reasonable Man to Unreasonable
Victim?: Assessing Harris v. Forklift Systems and Shifting Standards of Proof and Perspec-
tive in Title VII Sexual Harassment Law, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 717 (1993) (analyzing the
different criticisms that emerged from applying the reasonable women or victim standard
versus the reasonable person standard). Professor Schultz asks the problematic question,
"How c[an] male juries or judges truly ... know what offends a reasonable women?" Id. at
739; see also Toni Lester, The Reasonable Woman Test in Sexual Harassment Law-Will it
Really Make a Difference?, 26 IND. L. REv. 227 (1993).
282. 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
283. See BEINER, supra note 4, at 30.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 30, 36-41.
287. STEPHEN J. SCHULOFER, UNWANTED SEX, THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE
FAILURE OF THE LAW 172-73 (Harvard University Press) (1998).
288. BEINER, supra note 4, at 56 (citing Elizabeth L. Shoenfelt et al., Reasonable Person
versus Reasonable Women: Does It Matter?, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 666
(2002)). Studies show that females are better than males at understanding the perspectives of
others. Id.
289. Id. at 55 (citing Richard L. Wiener, Social Analytic Jurisprudence in Sexual Ha-
rassment Litigation: The Role of Social Framework and Social Fact, 51.1 J. Soc. IssuEs 167,
Spring 1995, at 167, 169 (detailing studies) (citations omitted)).
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It is no doubt distasteful to a sensitive woman to have such a silly man
as one's boss, but only a woman of Victorian delicacy-a women mys-
teriously aloof from contemporary American popular culture in all its
sex-saturated vulgarity-would find [the manager's] patter substantially
more distressing than heat and cigarette smoke of which the plaintiff
does not complain.
2 90
The result of Baskerville arguably may have been different if the judge
was female rather than male. It is unlikely that a female judge would have
analyzed the facts in the same manner even if she found there to be no vi-
olation of Title VII. As previously discussed, women typically experience
more sexual harassment than men; therefore, a female judge would more
likely understand how a female plaintiff perceived the defendant's behavior
in any given case. Further, Judge Posner's determination that only a hyper-
sensitive woman would find the defendant's behavior distressing may not
be an accurate description of how women actually feel.
It is logical to conclude that if women identify a broader range of con-
duct as harassment that a female judge will interpret the severe or pervasive
standard more broadly than a male judge. It is probable that a broader inter-
pretation of the standard would favor affirming jury verdicts rather than
overturning them as a matter of law. Appointing more female judges may
reduce the amount of judicial restraint practiced in Title VII cases.
4. Enact Additional Federal Legislation & Supplement the EEOC
Regulations
Although women have made progress in the workplace, "[i]t has been
four decades since passage of legislation guaranteeing equal pay and equal
employment opportunity ... and the nation is nowhere close to achieving
either., 291 In order to remedy the continuing inequalities that persist in the
workplace and diminish the incidents of sexual harassment, the legislative
and EEOC provisions need to be amended.2 92
290. 50 F.3d 428, 431 (7th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). In Baskerville, the plaintiff was
bothered over a seven month period by her regional manager, who made "urn um um" noises
at her, constantly called her pretty girl, and on one occasion made masturbation gestures. Id.
at 430. Simply put, a female judge may have found that just because the defendant did not
expose himself, show her dirty pictures, or explicitly ask her for a date or sexual relationship
did not mean that his language and gestures alone were not actionable under Title VII's
severe or pervasive standard. Cf id.
291. Rhode & Williams, supra note 193, at 235.
292. One possible speculation to be made is that the legislature has not been predomi-
nately concerned with remedying sexual harassment because of the male dominance that
exists historically in Government leadership. Id. at 240. Note that "[w]omen comprise over
half of the voting public, but only 16% of their congressional representatives and governors
and 20% of their state legislators." Id. "The United States ranks sixty-sixth in the world in
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New legislation is needed to increase accountability. Social science re-
search has established that when accountability is increased for the fairness
of decision making, bias is reduced.293 Requiring employers to report their
employee selection procedure reduces bias because it increases accountabil-
ity. Clearly, an employer will be less likely to make employment decisions
based on sex if he knows that he will have to account for his discriminatory
decision making. The law should require employers to provide information
on their employees' race, ethnicity, and sex-specifically, information relat-
ing to recruitment, hiring, promotion, and retention. 294 By requiring such
reporting, accountability would increase and the effectiveness of equal op-
portunity programs could be more accurately determined. 95 If this increased
accountability made equal opportunity programs more effective and reduced
bias, sexual harassment could be reduced as well. Generally, if the frequen-
cy of sexual harassment decreased, the amount of Title VII litigation would
decrease, and the Duncan problem would no longer be an issue.
One reason that employers are deterred from collecting this type of
employment information is that it could be particularly useful to plaintiffs if
a subsequent discrimination suit were to arise.296 Unquestionably, if an em-
ployer were sued for sex discrimination or harassment, past collected em-
ployment information would strengthen a plaintiffs allegations if the data
showed discriminatory impact. New legislation requiring that the data be
disclosed before a Title VII violation is alleged would diminish the prob-
lems associated with reporting because it would create a legal obligation.
297
In addition, a safeguard could be created by courts and legislatures that
would demand the reported data remain confidential.298 A confidentiality
requirement would insulate employers from the risk of having the informa-
tion used against them in court, but it would also cultivate greater know-
ledge of ongoing sex discrimination in the workplace.299 Some bar associa-
tions have initiatives, such as the "No Glass Ceiling Initiatives," which ask
law firms to create employment goals providing that women are adequately
represented in partnership and leadership positions. 300 Initiatives such as
these would promote gender equality in the workplace and would reduce
electing female political leaders." Id.




297. Rhode & Williams, supra note 193, at 259.
298. Id.
299. Id. Authors Deborah Rhode and Joan Williams propose that professional organiza-
tions supporting the advocacy of women in employment, such as women's rights groups and
certain media groups, could request this information if it was sought to show gender equality.
Id. at 159-60.
300. Id. at 260.
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sexual harassment and discrimination because they would help reduce the
superior power position of males and level the playing field while requiring
accountability of employers.30 1 In addition, government accountability for
gender equality should be increased.3 °2
Moreover, the EEOC policies should be reformed. Professor Linda
Hamilton Krieger suggests that the EEOC should amend its guidelines to
provide "more vigorous enforcement of existing laws."30 3 She also suggests
an information sharing system implemented by Congress that would require
the federal government to make the information obtained from employers
available to the public.30 4 Krieger proposes that releasing this information to
the public will persuade employers to comply with Title VII. 30 5 Releasing
information would be persuasive because the investing public would no
longer support the employer, which would ultimately cause the employer to
306Thpureform its employment practices. The public currently has no access to
this information because under Title VII the EEOC is prohibited from re-
leasing this information.30 7 Furthermore, information is not accessible to the
public because employers use arbitration agreements containing mandatory
confidentiality provisions as a condition of hiring and confidentiality claus-
es in settlement agreements, and courts issue protective orders during dis-
covery that keep Equal Employment Opportunity compliance information
confidential.30 8 Krieger's proposals may not prove to be successful, but the
suggested modifications are a starting point for the much needed reforma-
tion of sexual harassment law.
Another addition that could be made to Title VII is commentary to the
statute. Congress could supplement Title VII with extensive case law and
illustrative examples to effectively communicate the intended enforcement
of the statute. 30 9 For example, if the Legislature provided extensive exam-
ples of the misconduct that constitutes severe or pervasive harassment in
differing situations and cited prior cases for explanatory purposes, the trier
301. cf id
302. Id.
303. Krieger, supra note 198, at 313.
304. Id. Krieger lists specific descriptions of the type of information that she would re-
quire employers to release to the public through the EEOC, such as the number of sex dis-
crimination charges filed with enforcement agencies and the description of the issue alleged
in each complaint. See id. at 320 (providing a more extensive list of suggestions).
305. Id. at 313-14.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 315-17.
308. Id.
309. Hopefully, this type of addition would be as beneficial to sexual harassment law as
the Restatement of Contracts (Second) Commentary is to the analysis of the common law of
contracts. The commentary would not be mandatory but would provide links to case cita-




of fact would have a more concrete standard with which to compare the
facts of case at hand. Directive commentary would reduce the occurrence of
the Duncan problem because it would classify actionable harassment in
more distinct categories. Essentially, more distinct categories would prohi-
bit the judiciary from misconstruing the severe or pervasive standard of the
totality of the circumstances test.
IV. CONCLUSION
This note attempts to provide additional considerations that may re-
duce the amount of judicial intervention exercised in hostile environment
cases. The current standard permits judges to overturn jury verdicts as a
matter of law in questionable cases. In order to avoid further consequences
in the workplace and society, sexual harassment precedent must be re-
formed. In Title VII cases, the reversal of a jury verdict as a matter of law is
the most severe judicial invasion of the totality of the circumstances test.
Equally important, reversing jury verdicts undermines the role of the jury
and the effectiveness of Title VII.
In order to enable a true reasonable person standard to evolve, judges
need to let jury verdicts stand. Letting jury verdicts stand would help plain-
tiffs receive compensation and would help to more effectively promote
equality in the workplace. In addition to letting the verdict stand, courts
should refrain from using the procedural device-judgment as a matter of
law-in future Title VII cases. Furthermore, providing judicial educational
courses, appointing more female judges, and enacting additional legislation
and regulations would significantly reduce the occurrence of the Duncan
problem. The application of the totality of the circumstances test must be
either altered or correctly applied in order to ensure plaintiffs a more just
remedy. When courts begin to correctly implement the totality of the cir-
cumstances test, the Duncan problem will no longer be an issue.
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